Currently I hold a doctoral fellowship at the Department of Philosophy, University of Durham. My PhD is about the ontological autonomy of the special sciences. My advisers are Robin Hendry and Sophie Gibb. I have backgrounds in general philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind.
My present research focuses on the one hand on causation, causal explanation, on the other hand on emergence and reduction. Although these are related topics at present I’m mainly focusing on causation.
I’m interested in causal scepticism, the view according to which causal talk is illusory, there is no such thing as causation in the world. At least this is what our best scientific knowledge tells us. In fundamental physics processes have no direction, they are time-symmetrical. In a physical system there is no such thing as a cause of an event but there are many determiners of the event. In a physical system you cannot find the objects and properties assumed by causal talk. So, my basic question is, if physics describes things better, how can such a useful notion like causation emerge from a more fundamental reality?
Fields of interest:
- Causation (theories of causation and causal explanation, levels of causation)
- Emergence and reduction (the exclusion argument and its problems, the causal autonomy of the special sciences)
- Philosophy of Biology (reduction and causal explanation in the life sciences)
- Argumentation theory (models of controversies)